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bona fide purchaser. Changes that are an aid to clarity are found in the
combination of the provisions of the former Section 67(c) and (f) into
the new Section 67(a), and in the elimination of a reference to state law
from the fraudulent transfer section. Procedurally, the most important
change occurs in Section 67(a), giving the court summary jurisdiction
where liens are acquired through judicial proceedings. Many problems
arose under the provisions of the former Section 67. Because of this
fact, and because the section is plainly of considerable importance in the
trustee's collection of assets, the revision has been carried out with care
and particularity, and should represent one of the most important advances in the new bankruptcy law. But it is quite likely that even under
the new Section 67, problems that are now unanticipated will arise.
C.E.H.

NOTES
Discrimination Between Resident and Non-Resident Creditors in the
Distribution of the Assets of an Insolvent Debtor
Forty years ago the United States Supreme Court declared invalid
a Tennessee statute according resident creditors priority over non-resident
creditors in the distribution of an insolvent corporation's assets.1 The
Court stated that the privileges and immunities clause of the United States
Constitution forbade such discrimination. 2 Strangely enough the implii. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898). But the rule of the Blake case does
not apply to the distribution of a fund deposited in a state by a foreign corporation as a
condition of doing business there under a provision that such a fund is exclusively for
the benefit of local creditors. Id. at 257. Accord: People v. Granite State Provident
Ass'n, i6I N. Y. 492, 55 N. E. 1053 (I9OO) ; Lewis v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n,
98 Wis. 203, 73 N. W. 793 (1898). But see Irwin v. Granite State Provident Ass'n,
56 N. J. Eq. 244, 38 Atl. 68o (1897). Apparently the reason offered for this exception
is that the corporation must be considered as having assented to the constitutionality of
a trust of this character. Lewis v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra. Such a
distinction, however, seems tenuous and the reason offered inept. The only question
should be whether non-resident creditors have waived such protection; the corporation
cannot waive it for them.
Apparently there is no constitutional objection to deferring a foreign creditor of a
foreign corporation if such a creditor is also a foreign corporation, since a foreign corporation is not a citizen within the protection of the privileges and immunities clause.
Blake v. McClung, supra, at 259.
2. The court expressly held that the word "resident" as used in the statute meant
"citizen". There are, however, a number of later cases in which the Supreme Court of
the United States has permitted a distinction between residents and non-residents for
some purposes. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465 (i9ig) ; Maxwell v. Bugbee,
250 U. S. 525 (I919) ; Douglas v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Ry., 279 U. S.
377 (i929). But see Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 6o (1920). In

(I934) 19 IowA L. REv. 62o, 621, the case writer suggests that the Supreme Court has
completely reversed itself and has returned to Justice Brewer's dissenting opinion in
Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 262 (i8g8), which was to the effect that "resident"

and "citizen" are not synonymous for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause.
Such a conclusion, however, is not warranted by a close examination of the later cases.
It is hardly likely that the Supreme Court would now uphold a preference to a resident
creditor and a discrimination against a non-resident creditor simply because the latter
may be a citizen of the same state as the resident creditor. If that were so, the same
statute declared invalid by the Court in the Blake case would now be valid merely because it used the words residents instead of citizens, although its purpose was clearly
to prefer local citizens and discriminate against citizens of other states. See Note
(1923) 8 MINN. L. REV. 47; cf. (930)

24 ILL. L. REv. 826.
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cations of this decision are as yet unsettled and there is no firm line on
which its imprints on the law can be traced. In what respect does this
decision affect, if at all, the rights of a foreign assignee for the benefit of
creditors as against the rights of local creditors? Is a local policy which
prefers resident creditors to foreign assignees but denies such a preference
to non-resident creditors an unconstitutional discrimination within this
rule? Is a local policy which prefers resident creditors to foreign receivers or statutory liquidators but denies such a preference to non-resident
creditors likewise an unconstitutional discrimination within this rule?
Although an independent analysis would seem to compel definite, logical
answers to these problems, an examination of the decisions reveals conflicts of authorities and gross indecision. The general scope of this article,
then, will be an attempt to trace the effects of the rule of Blake v. McClung
in the situations outlined above.
The first and most elementary problem arising from the Blake case
is whether the decision outlaws a local policy which gives resident creditors priority in the distribution of assets of an insolvent as opposed to
creditors who are citizens of other states.8 It would seem that if a state
cannot do this by statute, as the Blake case decided, it cannot do it by a
so-called local policy, and that therefore such a policy is unconstitutional.
Although the federal courts admitted this was so by way of a loosely
worded opinion in Belfast Savings Bank v. Stowe,4 there was no vigorous
holding on the point by any court until I916.' It is a very unusual situation for resident creditors to be competing against non-resident creditors and this may explain the paucity of cases handling this situation. In
the ordinary case, before the race by the diligent commences, the debtor's
interest will have passed to a representative of the creditors. Therefore,
in most of the cases presenting the problem of discrimination, the issue
arises out of an attachment made by a resident or non-resident creditor
and an objection made by a foreign assignee or receiver.
In the field of foreign assignments for the benefit of creditors, the
application of the rule under discussion has caused not a little difficulty. 6
To begin with, the subject of conflict of laws relating to the extraterritorial effect of these assignments is so closely connected with the problem
of unconstitutional discrimination that there has resulted a mass of law
which is most confusing because of the inadequate and unsatisfactory
treatment of the constitutional and conflicts problems inseparably involved.
Leaving aside, for the time being, the conflict of laws question, the constitutional problem will first be considered. There are two possible situations in which may be applied the rule of Blake v. McClung in considering the constitutionality of a local policy which prefers resident creditors
to a foreign voluntary assignee. The first may be designated, for want
of a better term, a direct application of the rule.7 Thus, it may be argued
3. See Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. ioo, Ioo7, which concludes that such
discrimination in the distribution of decedents' estates should be held unconstitutional.
4. 92 Fed. ioo, 104 (C. C. A. 1st, i8gg), rev'g, 92 Fed. 9o (D. Me. 1897).
5. Brunner v. York Bridge Co., 78 W. Va. 702, 90 S. E. 233 (i916).
6. See generally Notes (1894) 23 L. R. A. 33; (i9o4) 65 L. R. A. 353; (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 593. See also WHARTON, CoNFLicT OF LAws (3d ed. igo5) §.353 et seq.
7. A "direct" application of the rule would be to classify the foreign representative
(assignee or receiver) as a person in the same position as foreign creditors, and thus
argue that any preference over the foreign representative is tantamount to a preference
over the foreign creditor and is thus a direct discrimination between resident and nonresident creditors which is forbidden by the rule of Blake v. MeClung.
If, however, a state chooses to prefer resident creditors to foreign representatives hut
will not extend these preferences to non-resident creditors as against foreign representa-
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that the foreign voluntary assignee is the representative of creditors, and
a preference of the local creditors is an unlawful discrimination within the
rule. This position might be even stronger in the case of a statutory
assignee 1 who has the power, as representative of creditors,9 to sue to set
aside fraudulent conveyances. Such an argument has, however, rarely
been employed. It was considered in the case of Belfast Savings Bank v.
Stowe, a federal circuit court of appeals decision handed down the year
following the Blake case. In the Belfast case a voluntary assignment for
the benefit of creditors was made in Massachusetts. Some property was
situated in Maine where there was a local policy of preferring domestic
creditors over foreign voluntary assignees. The court said that the "sharp
question of constitutionality" 10 raised in the Blake case was not involved
in this case because it was not shown that the creditors who assented to
the assignment "- (and thus inferentially, who were represented by the
assignee) were citizens of any particular state. Perhaps a more exact
answer to the application of the rule in this manner is that the assignee
is really not the representative of the creditors for all purposes, and therefore, this is not a direct preference of domestic over foreign creditors,
since there is nothing to prevent the creditors themselves from coming
into the forum state and demanding to share on a parity with the domestic
creditors under the Blake rule. Such reasoning, however, is not altogether
satisfactory and will be considered subsequently with greater detail in connection with foreign receivers.
The second method of attacking the constitutionality of a local preference policy may be termed an indirect application of the Blake rule. 12
Thus in the Belfast case, the court apparently held as violative of the
privileges and immunities clause, 18 a policy which preferred local creditors over foreign voluntary assignees, but which would deny such a
preference to a creditor resident in a third state who seeks to attach in
the forum state. Although there was a split on this point in the earlier
foreign assignment cases, no mention was made of the constitutional argument. 14 Logically, it would seem that this conclusion is irrefutable, since
such a local policy is undoubtedly discriminatory within the rule. The
difficulty that the courts experienced with this was caused by their inability
to consider it apart from the conflict of laws rules on foreign assignments
which had developed in a discordant manner."5 In order to understand
such a criticism, a brief examination of the principles underlying the con'flict of laws problem herein involved will be necessary.
Generally, a voluntary common law assignment of personal property
that was valid by the law of the state where made was valid everywhere,
tives, there would likewise seem to be an unconstitutional discrimination between resi-

dent and non-resident creditors. It is this latter type of discrimination which this paper
refers to as an "indirect" application of the Blake rule.
8. Although weaker perhaps in the conflict of laws sense. See infra note 36.
9. Moore v. Williamson, 44 N. J. Eq. 496, 15 Atl. 587 (1888).
io. 92 Fed. ioo, 103 (C. C. A. Ist, 1899) (italics supplied).
Ii. Massachusetts required the consent of all creditors in a common law assignment. May v. Wannemacher, iii Mass. 202, 207 (1872).
12. See supra note 7.
13. The confusing language used in this opinion apparently caused Wharton trouble
when he commented six years later on the effect of the holding. WHaARToN, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (3d ed. i9o5) § 353 (b).
14. See, for example, the collection of cases in Note (1894) 23 L. R. A. 33; cf.
Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. iooi, 1004.
15. See Sunderland, Foreign Voluntary Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors
(1903)

2 MIcH. L. REV. 112.
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and was upheld as against a local attaching creditor. 16 The theory was
that a voluntary transfer if valid where made ought generally to be valid
everywhere, being the exercise of the personal right of the owner to dispose voluntarily of his property.'7 Also the dogma developed that a foreign assignment under a statute providing for discharge or involuntary
proceedings, was a transfer in invitum and had no legal operation out of
that state.' 8 Hence the local attaching creditors prevailed over a foreign
statutory assignee.' 9
The rule of the extraterritorial effect of voluntary common law assign20
ments was qualified, however, by the doctrine of Green v. Van Buskirk
declaring that the assignment had no effect unless also valid by the lex
situs, even though it was valid by the state in which it was made. This
was based on the state's sovereign power to regulate the disposition of
property within its borders. With these principles in mind, it is not hard
to see the difficulty in applying the constitutional objections to a state
policy of preferring local creditors to foreign assignees, but refusing such
privileges to a non-resident creditor. So long as the assignment did not
conflict with the transfer laws of the lex situs, it would seem that the same
privileges of residents must be granted to non-residents. But in cases
where the transfer laws are not fully complied with, apparently the courts
were disturbed as to whether the non-resident creditors could object as
well as the resident creditors. 2 ' Furthermore, in the foreign assignments
x6. Livermore v. Jenckes, 62 U. S. 126 (1858); Roberts v. Norcross, 69 N. H.
ASSIGNMENTS (6th ed. 1894) § 275. Contra: Heyer
v. Alexander, io8 Ill. 385 (1884).
17. See the elaborate discussion in Justice Allen's concurring opinion in Willits v.
Waite. 25 N. Y. 577, 583 (1862). ButimL, op. cit. supra note 16, § 276.
18. Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch 289 (U. S. 18o9) ; BURRILL, op. cit. supra note
16, § 276.
ig. Taylor v. Columbian Insurance Co., 14 Allen 354 (Mass. 1867); Matter of
Accounting of Waite, 99 N. Y. 433, 2 N. E. 44o (1885). But see Taylor v. Life Ass'n,
13 Fed. 493 (W. D. Tenn. 1882) (holding a foreign assignee in insolvency prevails
over subsequently attaching resident creditors) ; cf. Maynard v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 92 Fed. 435 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899). Note that Chancellor Kent in Holmes v.
Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. 460 (N. Y. 182o) first wrote an opinion holding that foreign
assignees in bankruptcy took title to all the property of the bankrupt wherever situated
with the same force and effect as if the bankrupt had made voluntary assignment of all
of his property, and that such a title was good even against a subsequent attaching
creditor. But he later admitted that the weight of American jurisprudence was the
other way. 2 KENT, COMM. ( 4 th ed. 1896) 406, 407. There is still argument being
made to give this class of assignments the same effect as voluntary assignments. See
Laughlin. The ExtraterrilorialPowers of Receivers (932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 429,
462. See dictum in Martyne v. American Fire Insurance Co., 216 N. Y. 183, 194, 110
N. E. 5o2, 505, 5o6 (1915) to the effect that the rule preferring attaching creditors
over assignees under insolvent laws or receivers is so well established that it should be
changed only by statute.
20. 5 Wall. 307 (U. S. 1866) ; 7 Wall. 139 (U. S. 1868).
21. Franzen v. Hutchinson, 94 Iowa 95, 62 N. W. 698 (1895). Some states preferred resident creditors to a voluntary common law assignee even though the foreign
assignment was in compliance with local law, on the grounds that it would be contrary
to the "public policy" of the forum to permit all the funds of a non-resident assignor
to be withdrawn from the state before his creditors residing in the state had been paid.
These states, however, allowed the foreign assignee to recover as against a non-resident
creditor. Heyer v. Alexander, 1O8 Ill. 385 (1884) ; Woodward v. Brooks, 128 Ill. 222,
2o N. E. 685 (1889) ; Happy v. Prickett, 24 Wash. 290, 64 Pac. 528 (IgOI). Clearly
such cases express a local policy that is unconstitutional. Note that the RESTATEMENT,
CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1934) § 263, says (i) that a voluntary assignment is valid as to
personal property wherever situated unless (2) it conflicts with local policy or local
creditors. Such a statement, without expressly indicating that the same preferences
must be accorded non-resident creditors, would seem to violate the equal privileges and
immunities clause.

533, 45 AtI. 56o (1898) ; BUmULL,
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under insolvency laws, the dogma that the assignment operated only on
property within the state likewise raised the discrimination question. By
the overwhelming weight of authority the courts preferred their local creditors to an involuntary assignee. 2 2 Did the privileges and immunities
clause require the same treatment to be accorded to a non-resident creditor? Although the cases were in conflict, it is obvious that the Blake
rule should apply.2 3 A further problem is then raised by these results.
Since a state must accord the resident and non-resident creditors the same
rights against the foreign assignees whether they are voluntary or insolvent assignees, may a state declare that its policy is to permit subsequent
attachments by resident or non-resident creditors to prevail over prior
foreign voluntary assignments? It would seem that there is no constitutional objection to such a procedure, although, from the standpoint of
the recognized advisability of a unified administration of insolvents' assets,
such a policy would be grossly undesirable. Even today with the law
fairly well settled as it is with regard to the effect of foreign assignments
under insolvency laws, it is argued that they should be treated in the same
manner as voluntary assignments since the interest of unified administra24
tion is paramount to the securing of advantage to local claimants.
The discussion so far has been limited to common law voluntary
assignees, and those assignees under a statute providing for discharge or
involuntary proceedings. Suppose, however, that the assignment is made
pursuant to a statute which is merely regulatory and purports to codify
the common law. 25 Or suppose that the bankruptcy features in an assignment statute have been held to be superseded by the Bankruptcy Act,
although the rest of the assignment statute is valid. 26 The assignee under
such a statute is a statutory assignee. Since he derives his title from
the statute, the cases have not analyzed the nature or effect of the statute
involved, and have considered him in the same class as an assignee under
an insolvency statute.2 Obviously such a classification is unfair. It can
hardly be contended that a statute, regulatory in character and nothing
more than a codification of the common law, should operate to cut down
the rights that the assignee had at common law. The essential nature of
his assignment, under such a statute, is still voluntary.
The law relating to the extraterritorial power of receivers as opposed
to' local attaching creditors is replete with dogmas which are generally
(3d ed. 19o5) § 39o'/2.
23. Reynolds v. Adden, 136 U. S. 348 (890)
(refusing to allow such discrimination). Contra: Witters v. Globe Savings Bank, I7i Mass. 425, 5o N. E. 932 (1898) ;
Perkins, Goodwin & Co. v. Clear Spring Paper Co., i7 Phila. 168 (1885). There is a
22. WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS

tendency to discriminate against attaching creditors who are citizens of the state in
which the insolvency proceedings are instituted, or of the state in which the assignment
was executed. Bagby v. Atlantic M. & 0. Ry., 86 Pa. 291 (1878) ; Gilman v. Ketcham,
84 Wis. 6o, 54 N. W. 395 (1893). But the distinction is expressly repudiated in Jenks
v. Ludden, 34 Minn. 482, 27 N. W. 188 (x886) ; Barth v. Backus, 14o N. Y. 230, 35
N. E. 425 (893). It would seem that Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 1i9 (U. S. 1868),
which allowed the attaching creditor of the same state where a chattel mortgage was
executed to prevail over the mortgagee is conclusive on this problem. But see GLENN,
CREDITORS RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1915)
371-72, expressing the opinion that such a
discrimination is not unconstitutional. See a criticism of solicitude to local creditors
in GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 514; but see First, Extraterritorial
Power of Receivers (x932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 271, 277.
24. Supra note 21. See also Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 593, 6oo.
25. "The common law right of general assignment may be regulated by statute without losing its distinctive voluntary character." Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 593, 597.
26. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union National Bank, 313 Pa. 467, 169 Atl. 209 (933).
27. See, for example, the language used in Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead &
Co., 173 U. S. 624, 629 (i899).
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analogous to the cases of foreign assignees. Thus, it is settled that an
ordinary chancery receiver will not prevail against local attaching creditors.28

Do those cases allowing local creditors priority over foreign re-

ceivers violate what has been designated as the direct application of the
rule of the Blake case? 29 It has been argued that a recognition of the
right in local creditors who have asserted it can hardly be said to amount
to a denial of that right to non-resident creditors who have not asserted
it. In other words, it is contended that there is no actual discrimination
against non-residents because no right of a non-resident to attach the
property was actually involved. 80 It is submitted however that while such
a defense seems legally unassailable, non-resident creditors are, in all practicality, not actually on a parity with resident creditors. In the first place,
the settlement of claims and liquidation process generally is left to the
receiver by the creditors of the forum and third states. Furthermore, in
spite of the fact that the foreign creditors allegedly have a "right" to
come in and attach on a parity with the domestic creditors if they so
choose, the practical elements of time and convenience may operate in a
substantial manner to withhold from them this theoretical equality. It
follows, of course, that this line of reasoning equally is applicable to the
cases of foreign voluntary assignments heretofore considered. However,
no court has ever applied the Blake rule in such a direct manner, and
arrived at such a result.3 1
Does a local policy of preferring resident creditors over foreign receivers, but denying to non-resident creditors the same privilege indirectly
violate the Blake rule? In 1893, a Pennsylvania court declared that the
privileges and immunities clause compelled Pennsylvania, which preferred
its local creditors to foreign equity receivers, to give such a preference to
New York creditors who attached in Pennsylvania. 2 Thus, the constitutional argument in the field of foreign receivers developed even before the
Blake case. Although there was considerable dissent from this view at
the time of the Pennsylvania decision, 83 it would seem that the decision
in Blake v. McClung and its subsequent application in the assignment
cases would likewise have settled the question in regard to the receiver
cases. Certainly, insofar as the actual preference itself is concerned,
there is no discernible difference in theory between an application of it
in either of these two cases. Hence, it is apparent that discriminatory
preference of local creditors as against foreign receivers is an indirect violation of the rule of the Blake case, similar to the principles applicable in
the assignment cases.
Suppose, however, the receiver is not an ordinary chancery receiver
deriving his title from the court decree, but a so-called statutory receiver,
or statutory liquidator who gets all his rights from a state statute which
28. Choctaw Coal & Mining Co. v. Williams Echols Dry Goods Co., 75 Ark. 365,
87 S. W. 632 (19o5) ; Miller v. American Cooperative Ass'n, Iio Neb. 773, 195 N. W.
167 (1923) ; see Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. I, 3 (1879) ; Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb.
585, 587 (N. Y. 1859); Richardson v. South Florida Mortgage Co., 3O2 Fla. 313,
321, 136 So. 393, 396 (i3i). See Note (1935) 98 A. L. R. 351. The dogma is that a
foreign chancery receiver may sue only as a matter of comity in a state court, but he
cannot sue at all in a federal court. First, supra note 23, at 272 et seq.
29. See supranote 7.
30. See Note (1935) 98 A. L. R. 351, 381; Davis v. Amra Grotto, Inc., 169 Tenn.
564, 89 S. W. (2d) 754 (1936).
31. See Note (1935) ig MAmQ. L. Rav. I9o, 193.
32. John Ray Clark Co. v. Toby Valley Supply Co., 3 Pa. Dist. 518 (894).
33. Weil v. Bank, 76 Mo. App. 34 (1898); Receiver v. First National Bank, 34
N. J. Eq. 450 (I881).
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purports to vest him with title to the assets of the insolvent wherever
they may be located. 4 What analogies may be drawn from the position of
the foreign statutory assignee? As we have seen, the common law voluntary assignee has the most preferred position with regard to assets located
outside the state of his appointment. As for the so-called assignees under
insolvency statutes, the dogma asserts that his title "operates" only on
property within the state of his appointment. However, as has been
pointed out, in those cases where the statute is merely regulatory and adds
to the common law such minor details as posting a bond, or where the
scope of supersedure by the Bankruptcy Act leaves the other provisions
of the assignment statute intact, it would seem that the foreign assignee
should be given all the rights of a common law assignee since the essential nature of his transfer is still voluntary. The ordinary foreign receiver, acting under decree of court, and possessing no deed on which
to predicate his title cannot compare himself to the voluntary assignee.
But it would seem that the receiver who has title vested in him by statute
is somewhat analogous to the statutory assignee under a regulatory type
of statute, except that here again the receiver does not predicate his title
on a deed. Justice Cardozo has said, 5 in making these analogies, that a
statutory liquidator is more like a voluntary assignee than one deriving
title under a decree in insolvency proceedings, 6 and even stronger than
either in that for many purposes the corporation under which he claims
has passed out of existence. Apparently courts are not clear whether the
assignee under an insolvency statute derives his title from decree of court
or from the statute. Actually the statute usually gives the court the right
to transfer title by its decree. Ultimately then the assignee really derives
title from the statute. If the latter, it is difficult to understand why full
faith and credit requires a court to recognize the foreign statutory receiver, 37 although the question is merely regarded as one of comity with
relation to the assignee under an insolvency statute.
In the extended litigation of Clark v. Williard 8 it was hoped that
some of these troublesome questions would be set at rest. Unfortunately,
an examination of the language used in that case does not serve to clarify
the problem. Under a state statute of Iowa which purported to vest full
title to all the assets of an insolvent insurance corporation in a liquidator
on the dissolution of the corporation, the liquidator claimed a fund located
34. See, for example, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 121o (ordinary statutory
receiver) ; NEB. COmP. STAT. (1929) § 44-2o4 (insurance liquidator). It is not always
easy to know the exact situation which will give rise to a so-called statutory receiver.
See Note (1935) i MARQ. L. REV. i9O, i95.
35. Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112, 122 (934).
36. Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 173 U. S. 624 (1899), was cited for

this proposition. Notice that he uses the words "under a decree" which connotes that
title passed by virtue of a court decree. But actually title was conferred in that case
by the state insolvency statute under which the assignee was appointed. See HUSTON,
ENFORCEMENT OF DEcREES IN EQUITY (I915) 17, for a collection and analysis of statutes which give courts administering equity the right to transfer title by the decree
that they render.

37. Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934). Apparently the full faith and credit
clause has never been used in trying to get state courts to recognize the title of the foreign statutory assignee. If the statute is an insolvency statute, the courts contend that
it operates only on the property within the state. But it would seem that if the local
transfer laws of the forum are satisfied, under the doctrine of Green v. Van Buskirk,
5 Wall. 307 (U. S. 1866), 7 Wall. 139 (U. S. 1868), full faith and credit should require the recognition of the statutory assignees.' title in the same manner in which it
is required in the case of a statutory liquidator.
38. 292 U. S. 112 (1934) (first case) ; 294 U. S. 211 (935) (second case).

NOTES
in Montana, in contest with a Montana creditor of the dissolved corporation. Previous to this case, some states allowed the liquidator to prevail; 19 others preferred the local creditor. 40 In the first Clark v. Williard
case, 41 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme
Court, 42 which had held that the Iowa receiver was only a chancery re-

ceiver deriving his power from a court decree and could not sue in Montana. The Court said that he derived his title from the Iowa statute, and
a refusal to recognize such title and thus a refusal to let him sue in the
Montana courts was a violation of the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution. Thereupon, the Court sent the case back to Montana to
ascertain what the local policy of Montana was in reference to preferring
local creditors. When Montana announced that their policy was to prefer
creditors,43 the United States Supreme Court said there was nothing unconstitutional about such preference of local
creditors, and that each state
44
had a right to determine its own policy.
The difficulty of the case, and its relation to Blake v. McClung lies
in the choice of Cardozo's language. Since the contest involves a receiver
against a creditor, it is conceded that the Blake rule is not directly involved. Furthermore, if Clark v. Williard holds that because of the doctrine of Green v. Van Buskirk, each state has a right to regulate the transfer of property within its boundaries by its own transfer laws and not
recognize foreign transfers which are at variance with its own transfer
laws, no fault can be found with the case, although the hearing is not clearly
predicated on this position. A possible interpretation of the language
would indicate that a state may lawfully prefer its local creditors over foreign receivers, even if there be no difference in transfer laws and indeed
over foreign voluntary assignees as well.45 Conspicuous by its complete
39. Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222 (188o) ; Kinsler v. Casualty Co., lO3 Neb. 382,
172 N. W. 33 (1919); Martyne v. American Insurance Co., 216 N. Y. 183, i1O N. E.
502 (1915) ; Bockover v. Life Ass'n, 77 Va. 85 (1883) ; ef. Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34
Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. I55 (1928); Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac.
513 (925).
40. Zacher v. Fidelity Trust Co., io6 Fed. 595 (C. C. A. 6th, 19O1) ; Ward v.

Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 135 Cal. 235, 67 Pac. 124 (19oi) ; Schloss v. Surety Co.,
149 Iowa 382, 128 N. W. 384 (1910).
41. Supra note 33.
42. Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 94 Mont. 5o8, 23 P. (2d) 959 (1933).
43. Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 97 Mont. 503, 34 P. (2d) 982 (1934).
44. Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (935). See generally Legis. (1935) 48
HARV.L. R-v. 835; (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 6o4, 23 GEO. L. REv. 545. RESTATEmENT,
CoNFicr OF LAWS (1934) § 161, gives the statutory successor of a dissolved corporation complete title to all personal property located in other states, but reserves its opinion as to land in other states. In commenting on the rights of foreign voluntary assignees for the benefit of creditors, § 263 (2) says that local creditors would prevail
over the foreign assignee. Query, if the RESTATEmENT by omitting any mention of
local creditors or local policy in § 16I means that the statutory successor should prevail
as matter of right over subsequent attaching creditors.
45. "If title had been conveyed to an assignee for the benefit of creditors by a
common law assignment or by insolvency proceedings, claimants in Montana might
pursue their suits and remedies in derogation of the assignment when the law or policy
of the locality ordained that this result should follow. So much is settled by unimpeachable authority." 294 U. S. 211, 214 (935) (italics supplied). Seven cases are
cited for this proposition but only two are applicable to the case of a common law
assignment, and both of these are dicta. In the first case so cited, Security Trust Co.
v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 173 U. S. 624, 628 (1899), the court said by way of dictum:
• . . voluntary assignments will be respected except so far as they come in conflict
with the rights of local creditors, or with the laws or public policy of the State in
which the assignment is sought to be enforced." But even this dictum is not Well supported by the following cases which it cites to sustain its position. In Black v. Zacharie & Co., 3 How. 483 (U. S. 1845), the court held that an assignment was good
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absence from the opinion is any reference to Blake v. McClung.46 Thus,
from a perusal of the United States Supreme Court opinion alone, it might
seem that the discrimination which we have seen is outlawed by the privileges and immunities clause, is no longer so outlawed. That this is not
so, however, is apparent only after an examination of the second opinion
of the Montana Supreme Court.47 In that case the discrimination argument of the Blake case occupied the major portion of the court's opinion.
The majority of the court concluded that the policy of the state was to
prefer all creditors, whether resident or non-resident, and thus brought itself within the rule. Justice Angstman dissented on the grounds that that
court was only giving lip service to such an equitable rule in order to avoid
any question of constitutionality, and if, at some future date, a non-resident
creditor sought priority over A foreign liquidator, the court would back
4s
This then was the local policy which the Mondown and not grant it.
tana court announced. But Justice Cardozo makes no mention that the
same privileges would extend to non-resident creditors in Montana, or
must extend to non-residents under the Blake case, but merely says that
each state constitutionally can decide for itself whether or not its policy
is to prefer local creditors. Hence, it is difficult definitely to state the position of the United States Supreme Court; the greater probability is that
it accepted the fact that Montana extended such preference to all creditors,
and therefore indulged in no further discussion on this point.49
Thus, it seems clear that any state policy which prefers its own creditors over foreign assignees or foreign receivers, but denies such preference to foreign creditors is an unconstitutional discrimination. It is doubtful, however, whether the courts will ever contend that the foreign assignee
or foreign receiver is such a representative of creditors so as to bring the
rule of Blake v. McClung into play directly. Because of this, it would
seem that a state, if it so desires, may initiate a policy of preferring all
claimants, even as against foreign voluntary assignees without any constitutional embarrassment. Such a policy, however, would be most undesirable since it would strongly deter a unified administration of the insolvent assets. Indeed, because of this latter consideration, it appears that
merely so long as it was not bad by the transfer laws of the state of situs. And in
Livermore v. Jenckes, 21 How. 126 (U. S. I858), even this exception was apparently
disregarded. But the principle "as once more asserted in Green v. Van Buskirk, 5
Wall. 307 (U. S. 1866), 7 Wall. 139 (U. S. 1868). Then in Hervey v. Rhode Island
Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664, 672 (1876), the court, for the first time, used the
words "local policy" in connection with this problem. This word usage was repeated
in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 134 (189o) by way of dictum. (This was the
second and only other case cited by Justice Cardozo which was applicable to his statement concerning common law assignments.) Thus it is difficult to state with any
amount of certainty the position of the United States Supreme Court on this point.
Apparently, however, the present attitude of the Court, by way of dictum, plus the
instant "interpretation" of the second Clark v. Williard case, is that if a state has a policy of preferring all claimants (in order to avoid the rule of the Blake case), it may
express such a policy even in preference to voluntary common law assignees.
46. See comment in STTJRGES, CASES ON DEBTORS' ESTATES (2d ed. 1937) 162, following the case of Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935).
47. Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 97 Mont. 503, 34 P. (2d) 982 (1934).
48. Id. at 521, 34 P. (2d) 982, 991 (1934).

49. "The inconsistency in enforcing recognition of the right to sue, a right
dependent on the possession of title, while permitting a state to deny all practical effect
to the title itself seemed to demand an application of the full faith and credit clause to
reach a result contrary to the instant case." (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 6o4, 6o6, commentCf. "A title thus subject to defeasance
ing on Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S.211 (935).
would seem little better than no title at all, but it may be of some importance in several respects." (1935) 29 ILL. L. REv. 934, 936.
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there is much sound thought behind the argument that assignments under
insolvency proceedings should be accorded the same extraterritorial effect
as voluntary assignments. Certainly, if the assignee under the insolvency
statute derives his title from the statute, full faith and credit should require
the recognition of such title.
Finally, the cases reveal no clear-cut line between the legitimate protection a state may accord its local creditors, and what seems to be a provincial insistence on the priority of local creditors based on the time-worn
theory of the sovereign's control of property within its physical borders,
and its duty to its own citizens. It would appear that the "sovereign spirit"
of the state sufficiently should be appeased if it is allowed full control over
the law concerning the actual transfer of such property. 50 From this point
on there seems to be no moving argument why the foreign transaction
should not be accorded its full strength; thus, the state of the situs of the
property may retain the right to fix the details which will prevent discrimination against its own citizens, such as requiring a foreign assignee to post
a bond for the payment of local claimants before removing any assets from
the state.
R.J.B.
Taxing the Maintenance Trust
The trust has long been recognized as a simple method of evading
inclusion in the higher brackets of the income tax, and yet retaining the
larger incidents of ownership. Its only difficulty lay in Congressional recognition of this avenue of escape, and its provision for including in the
settlor's taxable income both the income from trusts revocable by the settlor
alone or in conjunction with one having no substantial adverse interest,
and the income of trusts which may be accumulated for and distributed to
the settlor.1 After allowing the handwriting on the wall to appear in Corliss v. Bowers2 and Burnett v. Wells,' the Supreme Court co-operated in
plugging the largest remaining loophole by its decision in Douglas v. WillCuts.4

In the latter case, the taxpayer, about to get a divorce, created an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of his wife. In lieu of alimony, this agreement was incorporated in the subsequent divorce decree, with the further
provision that it was to provide a certain amount, the husband making
up any deficiencies. The Court held that the income of the trust should
be included in the income of the husband since it came within the definition
of "gross income" in the Revenue Act. 5 The provisions in regard to the
taxation of trusts did not apply, when, as in this case, the trust is created
by the taxpayer "as the channel for the application of the income to the
discharge' of his obligation"." Here the trust did not have the effect of
releasing the husband from the obligation to support the wife, but was
5o. See Note (1932) 41

YALE

L. J. 593, 6oi.

§ 219 (g) (h) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43
In their present form they are contained in §§ 166, 167, 52 STAT.
519, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 166, 167 (Supp. 1938).
2. 281 U. S. 376 (I93). ". . . taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with the actual command over the property."
3. 289 U. S. 670 (1933).
4. 296 U. S. 1 (935).
5. § 22. 45 STAT. 797 (1928). Changes since made do not affect this discussion.
For present form, see 52 STAT. 457, 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (Supp. 1938).
i. These provisions first appeared in

STAT. 275 (1924).

6. 296 U. S. x, 9.
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merely a way of discharging the obligation. On its precise facts, the
Douglas case did not go very far. However, it is the purpose of the present
discussion to examine the subsequent decisions which, because of the broad
language employed, have extended its principle to a considerable degree.7
Soon after this decision, the Court decided without opinion three
similar cases, holding that the settlor was taxable on trusts the income of
which was to be applied to the maintenance of his children s or to the
payment of his debts. 9 Although it can not be denied that these cases
represent a logical extension of the doctrine that a trust set up to discharge a legal obligation of the settlor is taxable to him, it is unfortunate
that the opportunity to elucidate the principles of the Douglas case was
wasted with memorandum opinions.
Following the Douglas case, it again was recognized that income from
a trust set up by the husband in contemplation of the divorce was not taxable to the wife. 10 Where an attempt is made to make it taxable to the
husband, each case presents the separate problem of whether there is a
legal obligation which the trust discharges. For such to arise, the wife
must be entitled to support. Thus, where the wife was the guilty party,
and therefore under the laws of the domicile forfeited all marital rights,
the Board of Tax Appeals held that the trust was not created to discharge
a legal obligation and therefore was not taxable to the husband.'1 Two
similar cases arose under the laws of Pennsylvania, where, since 1925, no
obligation exists on the part of the husband to support his former wife
after an absolute divorce. In the first of these, Henry Oliver Rea, 2 the
Board decided that the income was not taxable to the husband as there was
no legal obligation discharged by the trust. In the second, Robert Glendenning,1" the opposite result was reached from the fact that there had
been several previous agreements which the final one purported to codify
and supersede, and that a support order, made while the divorce proceedings were pending,' 4 was to be cancelled. The Rea case was distinguished
on the grounds that there the trust agreement did not show on its face
that it was created to provide a settlement of the rights of the parties arising from the marital relationship; nor did it refer to any contemplated
separation or contain a waiver of the wife's interest in the husband's estate.
Admitting this, the fact remains that the emphasis in the Rea case was
7. It is difficult to tell from the language of the opinion whether the court is really
ignoring the presence of the trust, or whether it is recognizing it and considering the
settlor as the real beneficiary-the income in theory being given to him and then paid
over to his wife in accordance with the decree. This would become important in the
proper allocation of taxes on gains or losses on the sale of the corpus. See 4 PAUL AND
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (Supp. 1938) § 34.168, n. 62e.
8. Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551 (I935), rev'g without opinion, Schweitzer v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) ; Helvering v. Stokes, 296
U. S. 55, (1935), rev'g without opinion, Commissioner v. Stokes, 79 F. (2d) 256 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1935).

9. Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U. S. 552 (935), rev'g without opinion, Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
See Gould v. Gould, 245 U. 5.I,
io. Maud H. Bush, 33 B. T. A. 628 (935).
(I97). If the husband dies, his obligation to support the wife ceases, therefore the
income should be taxed to the wife rather than to the husband's estate. Cf. Thomas v.
Commissioner, 384 C. C. H. Fed. Tax Serv. if 96o6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
The same result was reached in
ii. Edward T. Hall, 36 B. T. A. 398 (937).
Llewellyn Barry, 36 B. T. A. 1328 (Memo. Docket No. 7934o, Aug. 12, 1937).
12. 35 B. T. A. 1132 (I937).
13. 36 B. T. A. 486 (I937).
14. Little emphasis was placed on the agreement that the support order should be
cancelled, apparently for the reason that it would not continue beyond the final divorce
decree.
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placed on the absence of permanent alimony in Pennsylvania. Taken together, the two cases indicate, in the absence of a court decree, that only
when the trust agreement discloses that the income involved is paid in
lieu of alimony or the wife's interest in the husband's property, is it taxable to the husband. Thus it would seem that in jurisdictions which do
not allow alimony, the husband could avoid taxation if the instrument is
carefully drafted. The Glendenning case was affirmed in a short opinion
in the Third Circuit. 5
The relative importance of the decree in establishing the obligation
is still a matter of contention. In the Douglas case, where the trust was
to provide a specific income to the wife, any excess being paid to the husband, the divorce court incorporated the agreement in its decree. There
is language in the opinion indicating that considerable reliance was placed
on that fact. But in Commissioner v. Hyde,:6 where a trust was set up
after 17 the divorce in accordance with an agreement made beforehand and
the decree contained no provision for alimony or other means of support,
the court held that the only reason for the absence of alimony was the
promise to create the trust, and therefore a legal obligation was being discharged.15 It may be contended that as the common law obligation of
the husband to support the wife ceases with divorce, and is continued
only by the statutory substitute of alimony, no fixed obligation exists until
set by the decree. But where there has been a mutual agreement that all
rights be waived in favor of a trust, an obligation arises, similar to that
imposed by a decree, which is discharged by the income from the trust.
A more difficult situation would be where no obligation has been fixed
by previous agreements of the parties, and no decree for alimony made.
No precise holding on this could be found, but it would seem from the
emphasis placed on the waiver of the wife's rights due to the contemplated9
trust that income from such a trust would not be taxable to the husband.'
A further problem in the absence of a decree for a definite sum is the
amount of income which can be regarded as in lieu of alimony. It would
be difficult to separate the amount representing the settlor's duty from
that representing his generosity. But the Board has indicated its willingness to attempt, on presentation of sufficient evidence, to permit segregation whereby less than the total income may be allocated to alimony.25 At
any rate, it would seem that where a decree for a definite sum has been
made, income in excess of this amount derived from a trust set up to pay
it would not be taxable to the settlor.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Commissioner
v. Tuttle,2' arising under Michigan law, distinguished the Douglas case
15. 97 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
16. 82 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
17. In John Ernest Goldring, 36 B. T. A. 779 (1937), the same result was reached
when the trust was set up before the decree.
18. To the same effect is Albert C. Whitaker, 33 B. T. A. 865 (1935), appeal disinissed, 87 F. (2d) io22 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
ig. The result in such a case might well depend on how far the court might go to
find a legal obligation. If they refuse to look beyond the trust instrument, the Rca
case, discussed suPra, might control. However, if the court is willing to go back of
the instrument, a logical result would be to put the burden on the government to prove
that the trust was established shortly before the divorce and that no further settlement
was made. It should then be the taxpayer's duty to prove that the trust was not in
fact set up instead of alimony.
2o. Thorne Donnelley, 37 B. T. A., Jan. 14, 1938. But cf. Frank T. Hogan, 35 B.
T. A. 26 (1936).
21. 89 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).
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on two substantial grounds, and held that the income from the trust involved, although substantially similar to the one in the Douglas case, was not
taxable to the settlor. The court first carefully pointed out that in Michigan, the divorce court is bound, in the absence of fraud, by the agreement
of the parties; the decree incorporating the agreement may not be revised; and the efficacy springs from the agreement and not from the decree.
In Minnesota, where the divorce in the Douglas case was obtained, the
divorce court can use its own discretion in adopting the agreement in its
decree, can alter or revise it, and the binding effect comes from the decree
and not the agreement. A second distinction made was that in the Douglas
case the settlement provided for a specific sum, deficiencies to be made
up by the settlor, and excess to be paid to him, while in the Tuttle case the
amount was to be whatever the income of the particular property transferred happened to be. Thus, the court argued, the obligation of the settlor to support his wife did not continue. "Upon the creation of the trust,
the trustor's obligation to his wife under both the contract and the decree
were fully and finally liquidated." The distinction boils down to the difference between the discharge of the same obligation when it is created in
different ways-by means of a private settlement or by means of a court
decree. Even admitting the distinction in fact, there seems to be little
reason for holding that the creation of a trust fully discharges the one,
while only payment of income discharges the other. The court omitted
to discuss the apparently contra cases of Commissioner v. Hyde 22 and
one opportunity to follow the Tuttle case
Helvering v. Brooks.2 3 At least
24
has been refused by the Board.

A further problem in respect to the alimony trust arises with the
remarriage of the wife. In Harry S. Blumenthal, 25 a trust was established
in pursuance of the decree granting the divorce. The wife remarried three
years later. The Board held that the obligation to support ceased with
her remarriage, and that the income was not thereafter taxable to the husband. A contrary result was reached in Alsop v. Commissioner2 6 where
the parties agreed, after a suggestion to that effect by the court, that the
trust should be created "in lieu of alimony". The wife subsequently remarried and her second husband was still living. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals admitted that the obligation to support had disappeared but
held that the income was still taxable to the settlor. This result was based
on the reasoning that, as the husband created the trust in lieu of alimony,
he made a bargain by which he escaped the payment of alimony; that he
took a chance on it being a good or bad bargain, depending on future
events, and that therefore the obligation incurred was for the duration
of the trust-the lifetime of the wife. Although sanctioned by the Supreme
Court, this argument seems to be neither practical, nor, as the court half
admits, desirable.2 7 Regardless of how the trust was created, the only
reason for marking it as one of which the income is taxable to the settlor
is because it discharges a legal obligation, that of supporting the wife,
whether by means of alimony or not. Therefore, when support is no longer
required, whether because of her remarriage or death, the income should
See supra note i6.
82 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
24. See Stephen J. Leonard, 36 B. T. A. 563, 571 (937) ; John Ernest Goldring,
36 B. T. A. 779, 785 (937).
25. 34 B. T. A. 994 (936).
26. 92 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), cert. denied, 3o2 U. S. 767 (938).
27. "It may seem hard that the petitioner must pay taxes on the income which sup" Id. at 150.
ports another man's wife....
22.
23.
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no longer be taxed to him.

The Blumenthal case was affirmed by a per

28
curiam decision in the Second Circuit.

In some instances, the husband, instead of creating a new trust, has
assigned to the wife a portion of an existing one of which he is the beneficiary. The Board has held that although the trust was not created in
contemplation of divorce, this is not sufficient to distinguish it from Doug29
las v. Willcuts. That the assignment discharges an obligation is enough.
'Where the husband and wife are still in a state of domestic bliss, it
is much more difficult to find an obligation. In Shanley v. Bowers,0 the
husband set up a trust, a certain amount of the income of which was to
be paid to the wife. No mention was made in the agreement of any duty
which was discharged by the trust, and there was no restriction placed
on the use of the money. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals spent little
time in refuting the argument that the trust was in the discharge of a
marital duty and therefore within the principle of the Douglas case. "Certainly a man must be able to make his wife a gift, if he wishes, without
affecting his marital duty. No authority has been cited for the theory that
every gift by a husband to his wife must be presumed to be in discharge
of it. Nothing short of this will suffice to sustain the contention of the
case at bar." 81

An interesting and undecided problem would arise if, after a considerable period of time had elapsed, the Shanleys had been granted a divorce,
and the decree had been silent as to alimony because of the existence of
this trust. It would be difficult to say whether the courts, after all their
emphasis on such phrases as "in lieu of alimony", and "set up as a discharge of marital rights", could find sufficient ground in their former
opinions to hold the income taxable to the husband. But it can well be
argued that the trust, although originally a gift, in fact now discharges a
legal obligation and should now be taxable to the grantor as such. The
same result should follow where a father, in an effort to avoid the tax, sets
up a trust in favor of a straw man, and then has the latter assign his entire
right to the children. No case could be found on either point.
The Shanley case was followed by the Board of Tax Appeals in
Merideth Wood.32 A further point was involved here due to the fact that
the trust, although irrevocable, was only for a term of five years. Section
166 of the Revenue Act previously had stated that where the grantor at
any time during the taxable year had the power to revest title to the corpus
in himself, then the income of the trust was to be treated as his. 2 The
omission of the words in the 1934 Act,34 under which this case was decided, led to the treasury ruling that income from a trust for a term of
three years or less would be taxable to the grantor.2 5 Although the point
may not have been pressed in this case and no definite holding was made,
the Board indicated in its discussion that the term need only be more
than a year for the settlor to escape.8 6
28.

OO9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
Frank T. Hogan, 35 B. T. A. 26 (1936); Thorne Donnelley, 37 B. T. A., Jan.

91 F. (2d)

29.

14, 1938.

3o. 8I F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
31. Id. at 15.
32. 37 B. T. A., June 17, 1938.
33. This was not changed until 1932.

(1928).

See § 166 of the 1928 Act, 45

STAT.

84o

34. 48 STAT. 729 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. § I66 (1935).
35. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 166-1 (c) A (1936).
36. To the same effect before the Douglas case, see United States v. First Nat'l
Bank of Birmingham, 74 F. (2d) 36o (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
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It was recognized in two per curiam decisions soon after Douglas v.
Willcuts that if income from a trust is to be applied to the maintenance
and education of the grantor's children, such income will be taxed as the
grantor's.3 7 Qualifications have been added to this statement however.
First, there must be either some indication in the trust instrument that
the income was to be so used, especially where the trustee is the mother,
or there must be evidence that the grantor asked the trustee to so use it.
Secondly, the income must, in fact, have been used for the children. Unless both these factors are present, the income is not taxable to the grantor.
Thus in Henry A. B. Dunning,'s where there was no provision in the trust
requiring the wife to use the income for any particular purpose, income in
fact used to pay for the household expenses 8 and for the partial support
of a minor child was held not taxable to the grantor. In two other cases
the Board held that even though the terms of the trust provided that the
income was to be used for the children, only so much of it as was actually
used for this purpose could be taxed to the settlor.40 Although nothing
definite was said, the Board indicates that the petitioner must prove that
income was not in fact used for the children when the agreement so allows
it, while the government must prove in cases where there is no restriction, that the father had sufficient control over the trustee to indicate what
should be done with the income.
As the mother usually has only a moral obligation to support the
41
children, income from a trust established by her is not taxable to her.
It does not seem to be taxable to the father either, atlhough he is being
relieved of an obligation just as if he created the trust himself. This suggests the procedure of X creating a trust for Y's children to whom, of
course, he owes no legal obligation, while Y in return, creates a similar
trust for X's children. Theoretically, the position is unassailable. Practically, the court would probably break down the whole arrangement.
Even so, it would still be faced with the further problem, especially if the
trusts varied at all in size, of deciding to whom which income should be
taxed.
Thus it can be seen that in a little over three years the decisions have
gone a long way beyond the strict holding of the Douglas case. The cases
herein discussed have centered around trusts established at a time when
the shadows of the present rulings were still faint. It is safe to say that
37. Helvering v. Schweitzer and Helvering v. Stokes, 296 U. S. 551 (I935), supra
note 8. But the grantor is not taxable on income paid to an adult child because he is
not obligated to support him. Stephen J. Leonard, 36 B. T. A. 563 (937).

38. 36 B. T. A.

1222

(1937).

39. In Hill v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937), a trust was set
up by the husband for the express purpose of maintaining a home for his wife and three
adult children. The court laid aside the common law "necessaries" which a husband
must supply to his wife, and held that he was required to support her according to his
estate and rank. Therefore the income was taxable to him. This indicates the substitution of a moral or social obligation for a strictly legal one in these cases. Although
this has been done in the life insurance trusts, it was by benefit of statutory authority.
Such result is a long way from the Douglas case.
40. Martin F. Tiernan, 37 B. T. A., June 14, 1938; cf. E. E. Black, 36 B. T. A.
346 (1937). In Ryburn G. Clay, 36 B. T. A. 1326 (Memo. Docket 86169, June IO,1937),
the father, who paid his daughter's necessaries out of his own pocket, was not taxable
on income from a trust set up to pay for her luxuries. Cf. Hill v. Commissioner, supra
note 39.
41. Martin F. Tiernan, 37 B. T. A., June 14, 1938. See Yolande v. Perkins, 38 B.
T. A., July 28, 1937. In the latter case income from a trust established by the husband's
will was payable to the wife unless she assigned it to the children. After she had exercised her power to assign, it was held that the income was no longer taxable to her
when no showing was made that she had any obligation to support the children.

NOTES

343

no case involving a trust set up since the Douglas case has yet reached
the courts. Thus, whether the legal minds and scriveners that are pitted
against the Treasury department can side-step these obstacles will be seen
in the decisions of the next few years. At least a careful drafting of the
trust agreement plus a little co-operation between the parties, especially
the estranged husband and wife, will present many close cases. At the
risk of repeating predictions of four years ago, it does not seem possible
that the courts can go much further without express statutory authority.
Yet even now, all the loopholes have not been closed by the present
decisions.
W. F. S.

